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**How We Can Win the Long War: A New Interagency Approach to  
the GWOT**

by

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## **Preface**

The purpose of this paper is to propose a solution to a problem that will have a profound impact on you and your children as well as the future survival of our great nation. This paper identifies the problems inherent in the current interagency process as it relates to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The United States government (USG) is currently in a debate over the proper role of the Defense Department (DOD) and the State Department (DOS) in the GWOT. As we debate the proper funding or lack thereof for DOS, Al Qaeda and its global network of terrorist (AQN) are not waiting for the DOS to receive the funding and training it needs to assume the role it is assigned in the Global War on Terror. AQN has launch a global insurgency and currently, the DOD is in the best positon to lead the fight. DOD is the largest department in the interagency with the greatest capability and it should assume the lead role in interagency synchronization in the GWOT at the regional level. the USG must not allow the ideal solution to be the enemy of the good solution. Adopting the recommendations in this paper will ensure interagency coordination and the effective utilization of the instruments of national power at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in the GWOT.

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## Abstract

This study outlines the problems with the current interagency process and recommends solutions. The world has changed dramatically since 11 September 2001. The United States (US) government and its citizens are faced with a global network of terrorist organizations determined to attain hegemony by subduing the US using asymmetric insurgent tactics world-wide. The US national leaders both civilian and military have decided that this enemy can only be defeated by a global counterinsurgency strategy that utilizes all the instruments of national power through a coordinated interagency whole of government approach. This study evaluates the current interagency approach using successful counterinsurgent principles in David Galula's well respected book, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice. This report reveals at the strategic level of the USG, the lack of an interagency doctrine and a single authoritative entity to implementation strategy. In addition, it finds that confusion at the regional level of USG leads to a lack of synchronization of effort which endangers the successful accomplishment of the Global War on Terrorism. This study uses the problem/solution format to recommend the following solutions. First, the interagency should establish and promulgate a doctrine that all departments must follow. The military has shown that a joint doctrine is essential to integrated operations and interoperability. Also, at the regional level where the major interagency players have divided the world into different regional areas thus have differing regional priorities, duplication of effort, and conflicting advice to national leadership; the DOD should be tasked to be the regional synchronizer by converting the current regional Geographic Combatant Commands into Geographic Interagency Commands (GIC) that incorporate all the interagency players in a regional organization with one boss and one coordinated mission similar to AFRICOM but more

robust with National Security Council, Defense Department, State Department , and Central Intelligence Agency personnel given regional authority and power to successfully perform the GWOT mission.

11 September 2001 is a day that will live in infamy alongside 7 Dec 1941. Both days shattered America's sense of security and exposed huge gaps between what we thought government agencies were doing, what they were doing, and what they needed to be doing. Colonel Matthew F. Bogdanos, United States Marine Corps (USMC), a former New York City prosecutor who joined the Marines after 9/11 states, "On September 11, 2001, the United States possessed superb military forces, unparalleled information-collection assets, and dedicated intelligence analysts. However, it failed to use them effectively, suffering from an almost systemic and often self-imposed lack of coordination and information sharing among governmental agencies. When 19 terrorists hijacked four planes, murdering at least 2,973 men, women, and children from 70 countries, it was clear the status quo could no longer be tolerated. This new threat required the breadth of vision, speed of action, and management of resources that could be accomplished only through synchronizing all the elements of national power to achieve."<sup>1</sup> Colonel Bogdanos' quote captures the current thinking of Congress and the executive branch; interagency cooperation can no longer be left to the haphazard interworking of individuals of goodwill and friendship assigned to different agencies.


The enemy that struck on 9/11 was Al Qaeda, a terrorist group led by Osama Bin Laden. Al Qaeda is linked to a global network of terrorist (AQN) with the ambition to replace U.S. hegemony with a worldwide Islamic Caliphate. AQN has adopted a global insurgency approach to achieve this desired end state. The USG response has been to establish a global counterinsurgency approach to combat this threat. In 2002, the President, George W. Bush, framed this effort as the "Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)". He and the White House released a strategy detailed in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism that incorporated the following two goals: "Denying Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terrorist" and

“Diminishing the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit”. These goals are aimed directly at winning the hearts and minds of world state populations and helping weak and failing states become stable and secure. These goals demand a formalized USG interagency “whole of government” approach that will synchronize all of the instruments of national power (IOPs) in a worldwide counterinsurgency. However, the current process that arguably worked well during the Cold War where our focus was a monolithic enemy that allowed each agency to work in a stove piped fashion will not get the job done. The current approach (which I will call the current interagency approach heretofore) is not coordinated. First, each agency and department seeks to protect its turf. Second, there is no common way of approaching problems, no doctrine. Finally, no agency can mandate implementation of national policy across the interagency. All these shortcomings need to be rectified. In the past, the US was confronted by the Soviet Union, a state with conventional and nuclear forces, which allowed each USG agency to plan how to attack them with the need for little coordination. This new enemy is a non-state actor that is globally networked and conducting a highly sophisticated insurgency. Consequently, as Colonel Bogdanos stated, the interagency must change to address this enemy. The answer will require the introduction of increased authority for some interagency organizations at the national level; the development and promulgation of interagency doctrine; and the redesign of the Geographic Combatant Commands into Geographic Interagency Commands (GIC) with greater regional interagency authority. The GIC would include Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, Treasury, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Energy, and Defense Department Personnel with a synchronized regional theater security and cooperation plan for the GWOT. DOD would provide the physical facilities, the airlift, and security for all the other agencies within a coordinated approach to stability, security, and sustainability in the region.

First, this paper will give an account of why a whole of government approach is required. Second, it will outline the current USG whole of government approach. Third, it will use David Galula's well-respected book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* to evaluate how effective the current approach is when dealing with an insurgency. Fourth, it will recommend necessary changes needed in the National Security Council (NSC) and National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) at the strategic level of the USG to develop doctrine and strength implementation of policy. Fifth, it will show why the Geographic Combatant Commands should be converted to Geographic Interagency Commands (GIC) to lead the interagency process to successfully achieve the goals set forth by the president.

First, why is a whole of approach required? Al Qaeda led by Osama Bin Laden has a vision of Islamic rule of global proportion. His strategic end state is an Islamic caliphate with global reach and global power that replaces the current world order in 100 years (see Figure 1)<sup>2</sup>. His objectives are to undermine and overthrow the current leaders of the Middle Eastern states, then using this base of operations to influence the overthrow of weak and failing states, and finally, his endgame is the overthrow of western democracies. He has surmised the enemy's strategic Center of Gravity (COG) is the US government leadership and the operational COG as the world's poorest people. Bin Laden knows he does not have the direct, symmetrical power to confront the US government or the US military, so he has adopted an indirect, asymmetric approach: insurgency and terrorism. His dual mission is to use the insurgency to win the hearts and minds of the poor people and terrorism to cause the American people to revolt against their leadership by insisting on a compromise to end the terrorism. This strategy led to the terrorist attack on that fateful day of 11 September 2001.

Figure 1. The Islamic Caliphate



*Source:* Joint Staff's standard unclassified brief on the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT), 2006.

Osama Bin Laden and his organization, Al Qaeda, consists of more than one group of terrorist located on the border of Pakistan; it is a global network of insurgents with differing aims and objectives but tied together by a pledge of allegiance to Osama Bin Laden as illustrated by Table 1 below. The questions are, how do you confront a global insurgency such as this and is the current USG approach successful? Over the years, a consensus has developed around certain counterinsurgency principles that have been successful historically. There are a number of books available on the subject. David Galula book “*Counterinsurgency Warfare*” seems to have captured the consensus of the genre. Galula offers three keys to success for a counterinsurgent that can be used to evaluate the USG current approach to the GWOT:

Table 1. Al Qaeda Affiliations

GROUP NAME	ESTIMATED STRENGTH*	PRIMARY OPERATING AREA
Al Jihad (AJ) / Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)	>300	Global presence
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	<100	Saudi Arabia
Al Qaeda in Iraq (formerly Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al- Jihad)	Unknown	Iraq, Jordan, global support network
Ansar al-Islam / Ansar al-Sunna	500-1,000	Iraq
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	<100	Algeria, Pan-Sahel, and Europe
Asbat al-Ansar	~300	Lebanon
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) / Jamiat ul-Ansar (JUA)	Several hundred	Pakistan / India
Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)	Several hundred	Afghanistan
Islamic Army of Aden	Unknown	Southern Yemen
Islamic Group (IG) / Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GAI)	<500	Southern Egypt and urban areas in Egypt
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	<500	Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	100s-1,000s	Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Southern Philippines
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)	~300	Concentrated in eastern Libya, global presence
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)	Unknown	Western Europe, Afghanistan, and Morocco
Salafia Jihadia	>700	Morocco
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) / Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	~300	Algeria, pan-Sahel, Canada, and Western Europe
Takfir wa Hijra	Unknown	Algeria, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Lebanon, Morocco, Netherlands, Spain, and United Kingdom

\*Based on US Department of State estimates (2006) and National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Base.

First, there must be a single direction. Galula states, “Clearly, more than any other kind of warfare, counterinsurgency must respect the principle of a single direction. A single boss must direct the operations from being to end.”<sup>3</sup> Second, political power is superior to military power. The primary purpose of all military actions, battles, encounters are to give political power the room to work with the people. According to Galula, this means that where at all possible civilians should be in charge at all levels so that the people can see that the normal government not the military is providing them security and the military has not taken over the country. Third, all efforts must be coordinated. In his book, Galula states that a review of

successful counterinsurgencies suggest there are two ways to organize for successful coordination: one is by committee and the other is by using an integrated staff of military and civilians. He recommends that for higher levels the committee format is better because at the strategic level it provides for more input to strategy but at the lower operational level the integrated staff is better because decision-making is faster, thus the counterinsurgency can better take advantage of emergent opportunities. Nevertheless, he emphasizes that there be one boss to ensure a single direction. Using the following principles let us evaluate the current interagency process as it relates to the GWOT.

The analysis will start with Galula's first question assessing the strategic level. Is there a single direction in the current interagency process at the strategic level? There are two organizations tasked with USG interagency coordination: the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC). The NSC is tasked with coordinating security policy across the interagency. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1 states, "The National Security Council system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.<sup>4</sup>" The NSC system is suppose to provide a forum for interagency coordination and coordinated strategic decision-making that lead to a single direction.

The process starts with the Policy Coordination Committees (PCC), which are broken down into regional and functional working groups, with a designated lead agency. Each committee is chaired by an Under Secretary or an Assistant Secretary designated by the lead agency. The PCCs are composed of personnel from the Department of State, Department of Defense, the Intelligence Agencies, Justice, Treasury, and others. The PCCs deal with advance planning at the political and strategic policy level. The PCCs also deal with any issue cutting

across agency and department lines. There are several committees/working groups dealing with the GWOT. The problem is these committees do not have the ability to compel agency or department compliances with decisions. The representatives from those agencies and departments still carry the bureaucratic rivalries, jealousies, and turf battles associated with their stove piped organizations. All the PCCs can do is seek consensus or unity of effort. When consensus cannot be reached, the issue is moved along to the Deputies Committee. Even on decisions where the PCC agrees, there is no single authority to enforce joint implementation of the approved plan or policy decisions consistently across the interagency. Therefore, the DOS may implement the decision one-way and the DOD may decide that it should be implemented a wholly different way. Finally, there are actions which are agreed on but cannot be approved by at the Under or Assistant Secretary level. These decisions must be passed along to the Deputies as well. The Deputies Committee, the Principals Committee, and the National Security Council itself are hindered by the same shortcomings of the PCC; there is no single authoritative figure or committee that can enforce a policy decision across the interagency save the president. Consequently, there is no a guarantee of a single approach to implementing GWOT policy decisions within the NSC process. Hence, there is no single approach to implementing GWOT policy across the interagency.

Well, what about a single approach to GWOT national grand strategic? The NSC and the NCTC are both tasked with developing and implementing GWOT grand strategy for the interagencies. The NSC is responsible for overall GWOT national strategy formulation for outside the US.

Table 2. National Security Council Organization

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ORGANIZATION				
	Office of the Secretary of Defense	Joint Staff	Department of State	Other Executive Branch
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL	Secretary of Defense	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Secretary of State	President, Vice President, Secretary of the Treasury, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence, Chief of Staff to the President, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, Attorney General, Director OMB, Counsel to the President
PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE	Secretary of Defense	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Secretary of State	Secretary of the Treasury, Director of Central Intelligence, Chief of Staff to the President, Attorney General, Director OMB, Counsel to the President, Chief of Staff to the Vice President, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor, et al.
DEPUTIES COMMITTEE	Deputy Secretary of Defense or Undersecretary for Policy	Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Deputy Secretary of State	Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and other deputies of Principals
POLICY COORDINATION COMMITTEES (PCCs)				
PCCs - Regional	Europe and Eurasia East Asia Near East and North Africa		Western Hemisphere South Asia Africa	
PCCs - Functional	Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Global Environment International Finance Transnational Economic Issues Counterterrorism and National Preparedness Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning Arms Control Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense Intelligence and Counterintelligence Records Access and Information Security			

. Joint Pub3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations Volume I

The NCTC is located in the intelligence branch and works for the Director of National Intelligence but is also responsible for national strategic as well as operational planning for the GWOT. The following is the key portion of the NCTC mission statement from its website:

“Lead our nation's effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort”.<sup>5</sup> This agency is responsible for integrating and analyzing all sources of national intelligence and is responsible for all GWOT strategic operational planning.

However, there is a problem with the current interagency strategic planning process; the approach is plagued by the two agencies (NSC and NCTC) lack of a mandate that allows C2 over the other agencies in the executive branch. The NSC can conduct GWOT interagency planning and the NCTC is tasked with planning and integrating all of the IOPs to ensure unity of effort. But the NSC does not have the authority to mandate interagency cooperation with grand strategy,<sup>6</sup> nor does the NCTC according to Michael Vickers, the Director of Strategic Studies Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment. In his testimony before the Congress he stated, “The organization charged with national strategic and operational planning, the NCTC, lacks the authority and capabilities to fulfill its mandate. While there are numerous instances of integrated operations in the field, integrated strategy execution remains very much personality dependent.”<sup>7</sup> Because the NSC and NCTC do not have the capabilities or the mandate to enforce interagency compliance, there is no overarching strategic operational plan that all agencies are compel to follow. Therefore, even though there is an attempt to provide a single direction through grand strategy, there is no single enforcer to implement the planning and execution of the strategy.

So, Galula’s first criterion for a successful counterinsurgency, which states there must be a single direction, when applied to the current interagency process exposes a severe shortcoming. There is no single direction, because policy and grand strategy have no authoritative implementation mechanism. Now let us look at the second Galula criterion; is political power superior to military power? Galula is making the point that people should see that their

government is functioning to provide security and stable, that it has not been co opted by the military. If the people believe the government is in charge and can handle the job of defeating the insurgency, they have a lot more confidence and trust, which could lead to them reject the insurgent. Remember the USG is facing a worldwide counterinsurgency strategy and must adhere to principles that lead to victory. So, is political power superior to military power? At the strategic level, the answer is yes. As previously discussed, the interagency process coordinated by the NSC process, is overwhelming civilian led in the development of political policy and strategic guidance. The strategic guidance for the GWOT starts with the National Security Strategy (NSS), which sets the goals for overall US security to include the GWOT. The NSS informs the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT). The NSCT is the strategic guidance that drives the GWOT strategy across the interagency both politically and militarily even though there is no one assigned to enforce uniform application.

Therefore, at the strategic level there is little doubt that political power exceeds military power. At the operational level, the political environment for the GWOT revolves around working with, by, and through foreign governments to crush the insurgency. The lead USG department for dealing with foreign governments is the Department of State. It is “the President’s principal foreign policy advisor. The Department also supports the foreign affairs activities of other U.S. Government entities.”<sup>8</sup> The State Department is tasked with negotiating with hostile governments, convincing allies to provide support, and supporting friendly weak states that need help with terrorist elements seeking to overthrow them. These are crucial and important first steps in defeating global terrorism. If the DOS cannot influence hostile governments diplomatically, then the pressure ramps up to seek influence militarily. If diplomacy cannot be used to convince allies to provide resources to support the GWOT, the

military will have to stretch its combat resources almost to the breaking point. If diplomacy can be used to convince weak and failing states to accept help fighting insurgencies, they could potentially become a safe haven for the terrorist. Effective diplomacy is crucial to the success of the GWOT and is a worldwide effort that requires a lot of money and manpower to successfully execute. The truth is the GWOT has place demands on the DOS that it cannot fulfill without a significant increase in funding, capability, and planning at all levels. In 2007, the honorable William Gates, Secretary of Defense, said this about the DOS budget in testimony before Congress “Thirty-four billion dollars. That's less than the Defense Department spends on healthcare.”<sup>9</sup> During the same day, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, stated in her testimony that, “Right now, I don't even have enough people to fill positions. I'm at some 10 percent freeze on positions -- 10 percent unfilled positions frozen out in the field, and that's after having pulled every single diplomat I can out of Europe to go someplace else. And so I think that this is, again, evidence of a too-small civilian capacity to really engage in the interagency piece, language training, and the proper training that is very much valued by our officers.”<sup>10</sup> Finally, Secretary Gates stated, “The State Department does not have the authority, the resources, or the power to be able to play the role as the lead agency in American foreign policy. And the Congress has not been willing, decade in and decade out, to give the State Department the kind of resources, people and authority that it needs to play its proper role in American foreign policy.” As these quotes so eloquently but brutally discloses, the DOS falls far short of the resources required to accomplish its mandate to lead US foreign policy in the GWOT. In fact, it will take substantial investments of money, manpower, and time to lift the DOS to a level of adequacy; and that is time measured in years not months. At a time when we as a nation are

facing huge deficits, it is not rational to believe that the resources will be available in the near or distant future to allow the DOS to accomplish this mission alone.

The DOS quandary has led to the US military stepping in to fill the vacuum where the GWOT is concerned. The military is secondary to the DOS in all other diplomatic efforts, but in the GWOT, the military has supplemented limited DOS capabilities. At the operational level, the military, because of its worldwide resources and massive capabilities, has augmented the diplomatic efforts of the State Department through its Geographic Combatant Commands. However, even though military personnel and capability are being used, they are not being used toward a purely military aim but a political one. For example, in Iraq from 2003 to 2005, the 101st Airborne Division military personnel were the face of the USG. They worked with Sunni tribal leaders to integrate them into the political process, to arbitrate disputes, channel funds for construction, establish schools, and help establish the rule of law<sup>11</sup>. This is not an isolated example but some would say it the rule rather than the exception across Iraq and Afghanistan today. These actions are more diplomatic than military. The fact that the military is performing these functions does not diminish the fact the act is political in nature, which is not ideal but Galula states, “If there is a shortage of trusted officials, nothing prevents filling the gap with military personnel serving in a civilian capacity<sup>12</sup>”. So, even though the military is being used at the operational level, political power is still superior to military power. Nevertheless, this situation starts to uncover why the DOD and not the DOS is best able to lead the GWOT effort, at least at the operationally level.

So far using Galula counterinsurgency criterion to evaluate the GWOT exposes the fact that strategically we have a single direction but not a single enforcement mechanism to ensure consistent application across agencies and departments. It also shows we have political power in

the right position as it relates to military power but arguably, the military is accomplishing the bulk of diplomatic tasks in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now, a final question must be answered. Is there a coordination of effort? The counter terrorism team for the GWOT includes the NSC, NCTC, Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Director for the National Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, and Agency for International Development. The biggest players in the coordination of the GWOT are DOD, DOS, and CIA. At the strategic level, the NSC system is supposed to establish procedures for interagency coordination and cooperation. The PCCs, DC, and PC are composed of all the players involved in a particular issue, therefore coordination should be a foregone conclusion. But, as General Peter Pace, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, “the interagency climate, as it exists, does a good job of promoting dialogue about an issue. It also does a good job of laying out for the president what the problem is and recommended solution...the various departments work well when the president makes a decision and they take on their tasks, the agencies tend to operate inside their “stovepipes”...nobody below the president has the ability to control the process to make people do things<sup>13</sup>”. As stated earlier, there is no one at the strategic level assigned by the president to be the ultimate authority to ensure interagency cooperation. So, at the strategic level the answer to the question, is there a coordinated effort? The answer is no.

When the same question is asked at the operation level, according to Congressman Geoff Davis, 4<sup>th</sup> District of Kentucky, the answer is an emphatic “No.” Congressman Davis is a West Point graduate and was a Helicopter Assault Flight Commander for the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne. His article in the July/August issue of the *Military Review* captures the essence of the problems with interagency coordination at the operational level. Davis accurately points out that the current

interagency process was developed over 60 years ago and designed for a completely different world. A world that was bi-polar with the military as the primary tool in national security and nuclear deterrence being the dominate factor in foreign policy. This situation required limited coordination between a few departments within the executive branch. Because we face a completely different enemy in the GWOT, this operational approach does not work. The enemy is a multifaceted, world-wide global network of terroristic counterinsurgents and the conflict is based on indirect warfare, the need for all executive branch government agencies to be involved is essential. This means that at the operational level, most agencies must assume an expeditionary mindset with personnel rewarded for working outside their assigned agency. This is just not the case currently. Consequently, if the question is asked; is there coordinated effort at the operational level? A reasonable person would say “no”.

Consequently, where the current interagency process is concerned, the answer to the question; is there a coordinated effort? Is probably no at the strategic level and the answer at the operational level is the same. Even though there are ad hoc arrangements that truly work well, but they are not inherent within the process. As most experts on counterinsurgency will attest, these results are not encouraging where coordination is concerned.

In fact, a finally tally of Galula’s three criteria to assess the overall effectiveness of the current interagency process are not encouraging. In fact, it uncovers the need for some drastic changes. Following is a recap of the analysis of the current process. One, is there a single direction? The answer is no! Our analysis suggests even though there is an attempt in the USG to provide a single direction through grand strategy, there is no single enforcer to implement the planning and execution of the strategy. Two, is political power superior to military power? At the strategic level, the answer is a firm yes. At the operational level, the answer is yes.

However, some would say the military is called on to accomplish many of the tasks that should be done by the DOS because as Secretary Rice confessed in her testimony before Congress, the DOS does not have the money or the manpower to accomplish its tasking. This fact discloses the main reason why the DOD and not the DOS is best able to lead the GWOT effort, at least at the operationally level. Nevertheless, even though the military is being used at the operational level, political power is still superior to military power. Three, are all efforts coordinated? A reasonable person could conclude that the answer is no at the strategic level and a resounding no at the operational level. If you accept this analysis of the current interagency process utilizing Mr. Galula's criterion for a successful counterinsurgency then, you would agree that there must be changes made at the strategic and operational level of the GWOT if the USG is to be successful.

The first change that must occur is at the strategic level. The president must strength the authority of the NSC staff and the NCTC. The first agency that needs strengthening is the NCTC; it is already assigned the mission as the USG interagency coordinator. The NCTC is currently responsible for integrating and analyzing all sources of national intelligence and is responsible for planning strategic level GWOT operations. All the Congress and president need to do is provide the authority required to implement the tasking it has already been assigned. A number of experts as shown by the recent testimony before Congress by Michele Flournoy, Senior Advisor, International Security Program for the Center Strategic and International Studies back up this assessment. Ms. Flournoy advocated the following position before Congress, "Tasked with conduced 'strategic operational' planning for counterterrorism activities that integrate all instruments of national power and with assigning operational responsibilities to lead agencies for these activities, the NCTC has a critical role to play in translating strategy into an integrated interagency concept of operations and a family of campaign plans, as described above. Given the

criticality of these functions, Congress should ensure that the NCTC has not only the personnel and resources it needs but also critical intangibles such as the full cooperation of key agencies like CIA, NSA, Defense and State, as well as the full backing of the President, the Director for National Intelligence, and the NSC staff when it comes to enforcing tough or controversial decisions.<sup>14</sup>"

As the testimony of Michelle Flournoy conveys, the NCTC is one of the two agencies that can help to solve the problems associated with the lack of a single approach implementer and interagency coordinator. The second agency that can greatly improve this situation and help to win the GWOT is the NSC. Currently, NSC is tasked with the development of grand strategy for the GWOT. Given the authority by the president and Congress there is no doubt these two agencies, NSC and NCTC, can implement and coordinate this grand strategy. However, the interagency coordination and implementation at the strategic level will not work without a clearly developed and refined joint interagency doctrine.

The military services have clearly demonstrated that there must be a coordinated and standardized way of conducting business for joint operations to be successful. Joint doctrine is credited with the successful joint military campaigns of recent history, starting with Desert Storm. Currently, there is no similar joint doctrine for the interagency, which leads to a pick-up game every time a new mission is undertaken. The NSC was established in 1947 to advise the President with the coordination of foreign and domestic policy as it relates to national security. However, there was no direction to develop doctrine for the interagency. This has been a big problem for interagency coordination. This has lead to uneven implementation of strategy and an ad hoc approach to operations. In addition, because there is no interagency doctrine for the new GWOT, there are interagency personnel policies that are counter to the new GWOT approach. A look at the way the military has overcome similar problems is instructive. The military was forced to develop joint doctrine by Congressional directive through the Goldwater-

Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The military started the process in an environment remarkably similar to the current interagency environment; a number of diverse organizations that are competing for resources and that are culturally distinct that were forced to work together for the safety and security of the US. Because of Goldwater-Nichols the services developed joint doctrine that ensures joint operations is a cultural imperative with the services.

The USG could vastly improve interagency coordination by a commitment to developing an interagency doctrinal approach to achieve our grand strategy. This interagency doctrine developed by the NSC would seek to respect individual agency cultures, preserved their traditions and characteristics, while ensuring all interagency activities are conducted within the parameters of interagency policies. The interagency doctrine would codify a framework for policies, procedures, equipment, and budgets for interoperability and interagency operations.


Just as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was directed to develop joint doctrine and the services directed to support that effort, the NSC Staff should be issued the same guidance by the president and the interagencies directed to cooperate. This action should be reinforced by congressional action. To ensure all agencies support these changes and leadership is invested in their success, no civilian should be allowed to be promoted to Senior Executive Service (SES) level within the interagency without having worked a tour within an interagency staff. Once the interagency has a doctrine, there should be national interagency schools that teach that doctrine. An additional personnel requirement should be that all SESs must attend the interagency schools prior to promotion like the professional military education (PME) schools conducted by the military

To reiterate, the first step to implementing the change needed to fix the problems identified by the Galula analysis at the strategic level, the president should increase the authority

of the NSC and NCTC to provide single direction and interagency coordination to enforce the implementation of the developed strategic guidance. Moreover, the NSC Staff along with the interagency organizations shall be directed to develop and implement interagency doctrine along with personnel policies that support the promulgation and implementation of that doctrine.

The second step in implementing the change needed to correct problems identified by the Galula analysis is to solidify the single direction and interagency coordination at the operational level. The conversion of the current Geographic Combatant Commands to Geographic Interagency Commands (GIC) would be the best way to accomplish this goal. The GIC would be a regional agency that is totally integrated with diplomatic, military, economic, informational, and judicial capabilities under a single leadership so that all the efforts are united and coordinated. This is especially crucial because the GWOT will be won or lost at the regional level. All the IOPs must complement each other and strategy must meet tactics if the USG is to help win hearts and minds in this complex and diverse environment. This effort must take place at the regional level because the enemy is a networked foe that cuts across national borders as the battle for Afghanistan confirms. Members of the AQN are moving from safe havens in Pakistan into Afghanistan. This precludes a solutions that an Ambassador or Chief of Missions at an embassy could devise. AFRICOM is the model for GIC that could replacement the current stove piped GCCs. Since this is a global war on terror not a global negotiation on terror, the leader of the command would continue to be a 4-star general. This will allow the organization to call on the massive resources of the military when needed for direct action, transportation, security, and combat operations. The two key deputies would be from DOS and the CIA. The deputy from the DOS would be given regional diplomatic authority by the state department to advise the NSC on political considerations for the region. as well as the power to coordinate diplomatic efforts in

the region by working through the local embassies and local country teams which would receive much better support from such a strong regional organization. The CIA deputy would allow coordinated and integrated intelligence efforts so that everything that is done in the area supports the overall theater plan for the region. In a counterinsurgency, intelligence is the key to isolating and destroying the insurgents. Key advisors should be added from Justice, Treasury, and Agriculture.



The organization should be broken down into joint teams and assigned key areas. Each GIC would have the military commander providing performance reports on each deputy but the reporting chain for each would be as follows; the military commander through the SEFDEF to the President, the DOS deputy through the Secretary of State to the President and the CIA deputy through the Director of the CIA and the DNI to the President. The GIC would be tasked to develop a Theater Interagency Plan (TIP) to support the GWOT. The TIP would be an interagency planning effort that would include a plan for all phase six phases of operations;

shaping, deter, seizing the initiative, dominating, stability, and enabling civilian authority for each country and contingency. The GIC would speak with a single voice and act with a single purpose in each region of the world concerning GWOT efforts. Providing the President, the Secretaries of State and Department of Defense, Justice, and the Director of Intelligence with focused guidance and clear counsel on the GWOT; while coordinating all elements of the IOP to achieve consistent operational and tactical results and, providing a coherent strategy to accomplish GWOT foreign policy objectives. The GIC would have capabilities to accomplish the full range of missions from establishing a financial system, supporting elections, supporting development of a judicial system, to supporting and developing internal defense, to counterinsurgency support, the ability to execute direct and indirect actions. The inclusion of civilians in the top echelon of the command would ease the tension between a traditional military organization and non-governmental agencies (NGOs). This command would be more sensitive and more flexible in working with NGOs because of the presence of non-military organizations that NGOs are used to working with like the State Department's USAID. Because the GIC is integrated and interoperable, when NGOs are working with such agencies as USAID, they would automatically have access to better military security and stability in areas where their efforts meshed with GIC operations in the AOR. The GIC would be the beneficiary of the personnel policies mentioned earlier in this paper that would require interagency personnel to have an interagency staff tour prior to promotion to senior levels in government. The congress would have to authorize additional interagency personnel so their agencies and departments could afford to allow for the absence of these people working interagency assignments, preferably in the GIC.

The establishment of such a military/civilian organization is not so farfetched. Doing the Vietnam era, in 1967, President Lyndon Johnson realized traditional conventional operations were not working, so he stood up an organization called, Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). The president assigned Robert Komer, to General William Westmoreland's staff as a civilian operational deputy to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Komer was bestowed with the rank of ambassador by the president put in charge of unifying the military and civilian's efforts in the campaign to pacify South Vietnam. Westmoreland commissioned Komer as the Deputy COMUSMACV for CORDS. He reported directly to Westmoreland and was the third highest-ranking individual in the command. Komer did not command military forces, but he did have sole responsibility for the pacification effort. This allowed for a single approach under a single manager, with a single chain of command. The organizational structure set-up by Komer was modeled after HQ USMACV, there were civilian deputies assigned throughout the organization. The organizations were all half military and half civilian. These organizations make good progress but were too little too late to reverse the outcome in Vietnam. Nevertheless, they were widely praise for their effectiveness. This little testimonial from history presents an example of a command with civilians integrated with an expectation of integrated and coordinated military and civilian effort that worked. Consequently, the GIC is feasible but it will take a shift in paradigm and a sacrifice of stove piped, self-interested by all the interagency organizations.

Although these changes will correct weaknesses identified in the current interagency process, not everyone agrees with giving the DOD more influence in interagency coordination especially at the regional commandant command level. The problems articulated are captured in an article, *Interagency Leadership, the case for strengthening the Department of State*, "The

overuse of American military power and overarching influence of DOD's regional combatant commands has the unsettling effect of making American foreign policy appear primarily militaristic in nature to foreign observers.<sup>15</sup>" The article goes on to quote sources from several organizations, such as the RAND Corporation, the Quadrennial Defense Report, and the Defense Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, stating that the DOD cannot secure the interest of the U.S. alone. The authors insist that the DOS should not only be the pre-eminent diplomatic agency but it has to be the interagency leader. Their belief is based on the following two rationales: One, because increasingly there is a need for the use of soft power (diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, economic reconstructions, and development). Two, over-reliance on the military sends the wrong message to foreign observers. The writers of the article postulate that only the DOS can pull together the elements of the interagency to effectively counter the two problems listed above. They propose a reorganization of the DOS. They advocate the establishment of a Regional Chief of Mission (RCM) that would coordinate diplomatic efforts for a region. The RCM would be on par with the GCC Commander. This would require the realigning of the regional components of the DOS with the GCC regional borders. This would raise the profile of the DOS in the region and working with the GCC would attempt to achieve unity of effort. Of course, this would require substantially increasing the funding of the DOS.

There are some very good recommendation in the article, such as a regional DOS focal point, a regional realignment of the DOS to match the military regional alignment, and the increased emphasis on soft power. The drawbacks to the RCM approach overwhelm the positives. For example, creating a RCM as a separate entity to the GCC keeps the same old stove piped approach with the DOD and DOS each seeking its own agenda. This approach relies

on unity of efforts or the hope that the stars align and the individual RCM and GCC commander are able to obtain synergy. In addition, this effort would require the DOS to receive substantial increases in funds to accommodate this new organization with staff to include personnel, facilities, and means of secure transportation and communications.

However, if the RCM was incorporated into the GIC, this would eliminate any stovepipes, you would have unity of command not unity of effort, and the facilities, secure communications, and transportation would already be fundamentally available. The GIC also addresses the root causes identified as a need for the RCM addressed in the article. It addresses the need to emphasize soft power by including the capacity for diplomatic, economical reconstruction, and development within a united structure. In addition, it does not overly rely on military power but can bring it to bear if required quickly. Finally, it has the additional benefit of synthesized intelligence through the incorporation of the CIA and SOF under the same umbrella, which the RCM/GCC construct does not. For example, in a particular GIC Commander's (CC) Area of Responsibility (AOR) Country X is fighting an insurgency and needs military support. In addition, the insurgents are counterfeiting the currency as well, which is destabilizing the financial system. The GIC CC can send in troops as well as one of his Treasury assets which will be protected by the military troops without having to fight with the Treasury Department about who, what, when and why. Planning for Country X can be coordinated and executed quickly. Then Country Y's strongman dictator decides to threaten his neighbor for perceived injustices but it is really, because he militarily stronger but his country is resource poor. The GIC CC can dispatch his regional ambassador who understands both countries issues, to mediate an understanding with the added knowledge of everyone in the region that he is backed by a GIC with extraordinary military power. With the additional knowledge that all the regional

ambassador has to do is pick up the phone and call on the military with no need to coordinate with Washington because he is there representing a coordinated GIC response. The ambassador can offer humanitarian assistance or a beat down with the capability to deliver either. Finally, when preparing a budget for the GIC, all the faucets of the command (military, diplomatic, intelligence, etc) will be budgeted for because they are all linked. Because, they are in one organization duplication of effort is immediately obvious and where possible eliminated. These are just a few of the benefit of the GIC

In fact, the overall benefits of the recommended strategic and operational restructuring are inescapable. The benefit of giving the NSC staff and NCTC the authority to oversee and enforce the implementation of grand strategy ensures each agency is heading in the right direction in line with strategy, eliminating wasted effort. It increases the efficiency of the entire interagency since agencies will be guided to concentrate on their strength while reinforcing the weaknesses of other agencies. This would lead to a more effective and coordinated effort in the GWOT as strategy is the foundation of tactical operations, which is where the rubber meets the road. However, the benefits do not end there. If Congress mandates that the NSC staff in conjunction with interagency staffs develop an interagency doctrine and schools, it will set in place a theoretical and actual way of operating that will eliminate the ad hoc, sometimes we do it right, sometimes we do it wrong approach that currently afflicts the integration of military efforts with civilian stability and security operations. Doctrine would light the path to successful utilization of all agencies because everyone would know what to expect from everyone else. Once again, in tactical situations the efforts would complement each other whether than conflict more often than not. This has been proven by joint doctrine in the military which to be fair is still evolving but put the military in a much better place than it was prior to 1985. Further, if the

executive branch mandates that all SES candidates must have graduated from interagencies schools and must have service at least one tour with another agency, this would create an environment where senior personnel understand how other agencies work, develop relationships that would help to crumble stovepipes, and make interagency cooperation the norm whether than the exception. This summary of benefits at the strategic level is only the tip of the iceberg.

Benefits at the operational level are also necessary for effective persecution of the GWOT. The GIC gives the USG unity of command at the operational level. This means that instead of trying to beg, plead, threaten, or cajole agencies to work together, there is a hammer that can be used to mold this effort. This approach eliminates duplication of effort, streamlines decision-making, allows the USG to speak with one voice strategic voice, and allows quick reaction to opportunities on the ground. Moreover, it would help defend the budget of all agencies as when they go before congress they now will be able to speak with one voice on the GWOT. They will have a stake in ensuring each ones budget is right because each will be depending on the other to accomplish their portion of the mission at the operational level. For instance, in one region the emphasis may be on military action to stabilize and secure the areas with the diplomatic and intelligence agencies in support. In another region, the area is stable but it has a number of weak and failing states, so the State Department must take the lead with the military and intelligence community in support. There may be a region that is govern well and is secure but terrorist are trying to make inroads where intelligence is the main effort with military and diplomacy supporting this effort. With the GIC, all efforts are combined, complementary, and unified. Planning is done with all the players involved in the room, execution is done with all need players involved from the start, and feedback is accomplished with all learning together. These operational and strategic benefits cannot be accomplished under any other system.

Finally, how can this system be implemented so that the USG can accrue all these benefits. There are several actions required of the executive branch, the congress, and the interagency partners. First, the president must issue a Presidential Decision Document (PDD) or whatever name the new administration is using to initiate a single approach to implement GWOT strategy across the interagency to ensure decisions are implemented consistently across the executive branch of government. The recommendation is to empower the NSC Staff and NCTC to manage this process. The NSC Staff and the NCTC must be given the power to force the DOD, DOS, and CIA and other agencies, to coordinate their implementation efforts to eliminate duplication of effort and increase the integration of planning. Further, the president along with congress must mandate the establishment of interagency doctrine along with interagency schools to promulgate that doctrine. The president should assign the NSC staff to lead this effort in conjunction with interagency staffs. Moreover, the president should have the Office of Personnel Management establish personnel policies that require all SES candidates be selected from a pool of applicants that have attended interagency schools and had at least one tour in another agency preferably on a GIC staff. Most importantly, the president must have the DOD establish the GIC. These are the actions required of the president to implement the recommended changes.

In addition to the president, Congress must help with implementation as well. The congress must endorse the development of doctrine and provide money for more personnel and schools. The Congress must fund the necessary actions required to establish the GIC. Congress must provide flexibility in funding so that money can be moved between agencies as required by the GIC commander to accomplish the mission when the emphasis changes from one agency to the other.

The presidential and congressional actions are certainly required to ensure the success of these changes but the biggest change must occur within the agencies themselves. If we are to win the GWOT, the interagency organization must stop focusing on what is best for their own organization and start focusing on what is best for America. For too long each agency has gotten this confused. The agencies have thought that what is good for them is good for America. The GWOT has shown that this is not so. The DOD, the agency with the biggest budget and the preponderance of forces has begun to understand that it cannot go it alone. This realization is reflected by the fact that Secretary Gates has gone on record to advocate for a bigger budget and more people for the State Department. Nevertheless, the truth of the matter is the State Department will never have the budget or the people the Pentagon has at the operational level, neither will the CIA, or any other agency. Therefore, it is better and much more effective to allow the military to lead at the operational level with advice and consent from the other agencies. This does not mean that the other agencies cannot be the supported agency in an operation but that the GIC commander, who will be military, will make the decision of who will be the supported and supporting agency. Why? Because the military has the preponderance of money, people, and capability at the operational level, so it just makes good common sense. Therefore, a major cultural change must occur within the agencies. They must look to accentuate their strength and seek to mitigate their weaknesses by eliminating duplicative processes that are other agencies strength at the operational level. This will allow better utilization of their budget and increase their effectiveness. Correspondingly, increasing the USG's efficiency and effectiveness in the GWOT, will contribute to a winning effort. The fact is, as General Norman Schwarzkopf said, "The truth of the matter is that you always know the right thing to do. The hard part is doing it."<sup>16</sup> Most people within the USG know that the USG needs

to be reformed but they do not believe that the interagency culture will allow radical change as recommended by this report. They do not believe that the interagency can summons the will for such boldness. I believe they are wrong. I believe the USG sees and feels the fierce urgency of now. I believe USG cannot and will not wait while Al Qaeda and its terrorist network grow stronger. As Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe states, “Boldness has genius, power, and magic in it. Begin it now.”<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Matthew F. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step”, 1

<sup>2</sup> Martinage, Robert C, “The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment”, 43-44

<sup>3</sup> Galula, David, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 61

<sup>4</sup> NSPD 1, Organization of the National Security Council, 1

<sup>5</sup> NCTC, “Mission Statement”, 1

<sup>6</sup> Tussing, Bert B. and Butts, Kent H., “Aligning the Interagency for the War on Terrorism”, 1

<sup>7</sup> Vickers, Michael G., “Implementing GWOT Strategy: Overcoming Interagency Problems” 4

<sup>8</sup> Whittaker, Alan G., Smith, Frederick C., and McKune, Elizabeth. *The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System*, 34

<sup>9</sup> Gates, Robert, Testimony before “United States House Of Representatives”

Committee On Building Partnership Capacity And The Development Of The Interagency Process”, 3

<sup>10</sup> Rice, Condoleezza, Testimony before “United States House Of Representatives”

Committee On Building Partnership Capacity And The Development Of The Interagency Process”, 4

<sup>11</sup> Gonzales, Daniel, Networked Forces in Stability Operations, 101st Airborne Division, 3/2 and 1/25 Stryker Brigades in Northern Iraq

<sup>12</sup> Galula, David, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 63

<sup>13</sup> Pace, Peter, “Pace Urges Interagency Cooperation in Government”, 1

<sup>14</sup> Flournoy, Michele A. “Implementing the GWOT Strategy: Overcoming Interagency Problems”, 1

<sup>15</sup> Caudill, Shannon W., Leonard, Andrew W., and Thresher, Richard D., “Interagency Leadership, the Case for Strengthening the Department of State” 1

<sup>16</sup> Schwarzkopf, Norman, “Famous Military Quotes”, 1

<sup>17</sup> Goethe, Johann Wolfgang Van, Famous Inspirational Quotes on Boldness, 1

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